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ABSTRACT
The traditional pursuit-evasion game considers a situation where one pursuer tries to capture an
evader, while the evader is trying to escape. A more general formulation of this problem is to
consider multiple pursuers trying to capture one evader. This general multi-pursuer one-evader
problem can also be used to model a system of systems in which one of the subsystems decides
to dissent (evade) from the others while the others (the pursuer subsystems) try to pursue a strat-
egy to prevent it from doing so. An important challenge in analyzing these types of problems is
to develop strategies for the pursuers along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. In
this thesis, we investigate three possible and conceptually different strategies for pursuers: (1) act
non-cooperatively as independent pursuers, (2) act cooperatively as a unified team of pursuers, and
(3) act individually as greedy pursuers. The evader, on the other hand, will consider strategies
against all possible strategies by the pursuers. We assume complete uncertainty in the game i.e. no
player knows which strategies the other players are implementing and none of them has informa-
tion about any of the parameters in the objective functions of the other players. To treat the three
pursuers strategies under one general framework, an all-against-one linear quadratic dynamic game
is considered and the corresponding closed-loop Nash solution is discussed. Additionally, different
necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the stability of the system, and existence and defi-
niteness of the closed-loop Nash strategies under different strategy assumptions are derived. We
deal with the uncertainties in the strategies by first developing the Nash strategies for each of the
resulting games for all possible options available to both sides. Then we deal with the parameter
uncertainties by performing a Monte Carlo analysis to determine probabilities of capture for the
pursuers (or escape for the evader) for each resulting game. Results of the Monte Carlo simulation
show that in general, pursuers do not always benefit from cooperating as a team and that acting as
non-cooperating players may yield a higher probability of capturing of the evader.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Many large enterprises consist of a large number of interacting subsystems. These system of
systems (SoS) often operate optimally when all subsystems have a harmonious non-conflicting
relationship among themselves. When one subsystem decides to operate in a manner that is not
consistent with the others, the operation of the entire enterprise suffers resulting in an adversarial
environment that affects not only the behavior of the dissenting subsystem but also possibly the
behavior of the other conforming subsystems. The disruption caused by one dissenting subsystem
may result in the entire system of systems disintegrating and behaving in a non-cooperative man-
ner within itself. These types of complex system of systems are treated best using concepts from
game theory. If the systems are dynamic in nature, then differential game theory is the appropriate
framework to do the analysis. These types of problems are conceptually similar to multi-pursuer
Pursuit-Evasion (PE) games. Traditional Pursuit-Evasion refers to a game in which a number
of pursuers try to capture one or more evaders while the evaders try to escape. The solution of
these types of games involves the development of movement strategies for both the pursuers and
the evaders simultaneously that will conclude with the evader either escaping or being captured.
Problems that include many evaders can be investigated as a combination of resource allocation
problems involving multiple pursuers and one evader. That is, a wide range of problems can be
covered by studying multi-pursuers one-evader games. Additionally, in real and practical problems
there is barely certain information about the circumstances of the game. So, theoretical analysis
only based on certain data may not be useful in practice and examination of the problem under
uncertainties is vital. One of the most representative examples of the SoS approach to the pursuit
evasion game is a system of entities such as UAVs or robots moving together in a coordinated
fashion to perform a common task. If one entity decides to separate from the group and operate
on its own, the remaining entities will face the problem of deciding how to proceed. For example,
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one UAV or one robot may decide to leave the group and proceed on its own with an objective
that may be contrary or harmful to the group’s common objective. The remaining entities may
or may not agree on how to react. They may decide to pursue a group strategy in an attempt to
prevent it from accomplishing its objective or they may disagree on the proper course of action
resulting in a system-wide breakdown and producing a non-cooperative environment where each
entity acts unilaterally on its own. In many ways, these problems are very similar in formulation
to the traditional multi-pursuer PE problems. Another interesting examples of the SoS in presence
of a dissenting subsystem is the European Union while they’ve been cooperating for years, sud-
denly the Britain stop to govern in coalition with other European countries and Brexit happens.
Obviously, this action will affect not only the Britain, but also all countries around the world. As
a consequence of Brexit, the question is what strategies should other countries in European Union
use to minimize the effects of Brexit or possibly force the Britain to join the European Union again.
They may choose to stay as an union or disintegrate and stop cooperating among themselves since
the situation has changed. Of course that studying such a complicated topic is beyond the scope
of this thesis and it was just a real example of situations where the concept of SoS in present of
a dissenting subsystem may happen. So we restrict ourselves to studying multi-pursuer PE games
under uncertainties in order to make the problem tractable and to simplify explanation of the main
concept and rigorously carry the analysis further.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In 1957, Berge [1] proposed a PE game in which the evader moves in a prescribed trajectory
and the pursuers move with constant velocities but in directions that point directly towards the
evader. In 1965, Isaacs [2] considered a zero-sum differential game with one pursuer and one
evader. Following his work a variety of different formulations of PE games have been studied in
the literature [3–9] including zero-sum [5], non-zero sum [10] and even Stackelberg [8, 9] games.
The dynamics of the game can be formulated either in terms of velocity control [5,11], or in terms
of constant velocities but direction of movement control [12–14]. In recent years, multi-pursuers
one-evader games have received considerable attention in the literature [3, 7, 15–18]. Compared
to the original single-pursuer single-evader game, these games present numerous challenges in
developing optimal strategies, including the structure, existence and uniqueness of the pursuers
strategies [19–23]. The effectiveness of different strategies in presence of parameters uncertainty
for a dynamic two-step look-ahead game has been studied in [24]. In [15], a multi-pursuers one-
evader game has been studied in the presence of limited state information for the pursuers’ side.
The problem is formulated as a 2-player linear-quadratic game with the pursuers cooperating as
one team (i.e. as one player) against the evader. This necessitated the introduction of so-called
best achievable performance indices for the pursuers. In [25], a two-pursuer one-evader game is
considered and decomposition for reduction of time complexity of the solution is introduced and
comparing the run-time complexity of both the decomposed and the full game has shown that
with increasing cardinality of each player’s strategy space the decomposed game yields a relevant
decrease of the run-time.
In this thesis, and before we investigate multi-pursuers one-evader games, we will consider a gen-
eral framework that can be used to investigate several possible structural solutions for these types
of PE games. More specifically, we consider an (N+1)-player linear quadratic game where N
3
players are minimizing quadratic objective functions while the remaining player is maximizing
a similar quadratic objective function. We refer to these games as all-against-one, reflecting the
fact that one player’s objective is directly opposed to all the other players. In chapter 3 we con-
sider a general treatment of all-against-one Linear Quadratic (LQ) games including the derivation
of new sufficient conditions for existence of closed-loop Nash solutions. In chapter 4 we formu-
late the N-pursuers one-evader game as a special case of the all-against-one game and investigate
three different strategies for the pursuers. These strategies include Non-cooperating pursuers, Co-
operating pursuers and Greedy pursuers. In chapter 5 we present several illustrative examples
that describe different pursuit-evasion scenarios and show simulation results for all three pursuers’
strategies when the evader is using a strategy that yields the Nash equilibrium in each case. In the
same chapter, we present some preliminary results where neither the pursuers nor the evader have
knowledge the objective functions of the other side and hence need to implement strategies that
are secure against possible worst strategies by the other side. Results of Monte Carlo simulations
of these incomplete information games are also reported. Concluding remarks are presented in
chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 3: All-AGAINST-ONE GAMES
In this chapter we consider an (N+1)-player game where N players are minimizing similar objective
functions while the remaining player is minimizing another objective function which is completely
opposing to the other players. We refer to these games as all-against-one, reflecting the fact that
one player’s objective is directly opposed to all the others. Let M = N + 1, where player 1 is the
opposing player and players 2 through M are all against player 1. To make the problem tractable,
let the game has linear dynamics and quadratic objective functions for players in the standard
form [10] and [26]
z˙ = Az +B1u1 +
M∑
j=2
Bjuj, z(t0) = z0; (3.1)
where z is the state vector and u1 through uM are the player’s control input vector. Matrix A is
the open-loop system dynamics, matrices B1 through BM are player’s input matrices, respectively.
Let the objective function of player 1 be of the form
J1 =
1
2
z(tf )
ᵀS1fz(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
[z(t)ᵀQ1z(t) + u1(t)
ᵀR1u1(t)]dt, (3.2)
where S1f and Q1 are symmetric negative definite matrices1 and R1 is symmetric positive definite
matrix. Let the objective functions of players 2 through M be of the form
Ji =
1
2
z(tf )
ᵀSifz(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
[z(t)ᵀQiz(t) + ui(t)
ᵀRiui(t)]dt; (3.3)
for i = 2, 3, ...,M , where Sif and Qi are symmetric positive semi-definite matrices and Ri is
symmetric positive definite matrix. The main difference between this game and the standard LQ
game considered in the literature is that player 1 has weight matrices S1f and Q1 that are not of the
1We require these matrices to be negative definite instead of negative semi-definite so that player 1 would not have
the option to exclude any of the players who are against it.
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same sign as similar matrices of the other players. In other words, player 1 is trying to unregulate
(drive the state vector of the system away from the origin) while players 2 through M are trying
to regulate the system (drive the state vector of the system to the origin). It is well known that
necessary conditions for the closed-loop Nash strategies for this game are of the form [10]
u∗i = −R−1i BiSiz (3.4)
for i = 1, 2, ...,M , where Si’s satisfy the following M-coupled differential Riccati equations,
S˙i + SiA+ A
ᵀSi +Qi + SiBiR
−1
i B
ᵀ
i Si −
M∑
j=1
(SiBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj + SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSi) = 0, (3.5)
where Si(tf ) = Sif . It is well-known that for the standard LQ non-zero-sum game that if Qi ≥ 0
and Sif ≥ 0, then the solution for (3.5) will be Si(t) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, ...,M [27]. The following
lemma provides the equivalent result for the all-against-one game.
Lemma 1. For the all-against-one game let Si(t) for i = 1, 2, ...,M be solutions of (3.5) for
t ∈ [t0, tf ], then S1(t) < 0 and Si(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ], for i = 2, 3, ...,M .
Proof. Assume λmaxS1 (t) and v(t) are maximal eigenvalue and corresponding unit eigenvector of
S1(t), respectively. S1(t) is piecewise continuously differentiable and symmetric for t ∈ [t0, tf ]
but not necessarily analytic. So based on Theorem 3.6.1 in [27], λmaxS1 (t) is continuous in time and
at any point that it is differentiable, its derivative satisfies
d
dt
(
λmaxS1 (t)
)
=vᵀ(t)S˙1v(t) (3.6)
=− vᵀ(t)(S1A+ AᵀS1 + S1B1R−11 Bᵀ1S1)v(t) +
M∑
j=1
(
vᵀ(t)S1BjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSjv(t)
+ vᵀ(t)SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jS1v(t)
)− vᵀ(t)Q1v(t) (3.7)
6
=λmaxS1 (t)v
ᵀ(t)
[
− 2A− λmaxS1 (t)B1R−11 Bᵀ1 +
M∑
j=1
(
BjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj + SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
j
)]
v(t)
− vᵀ(t)Q1v(t). (3.8)
Now for sufficiently small λmaxS1 (t) we have
d
dt
(
λmaxS1 (t)
) ≈ −vᵀ(t)Q1v(t) (3.9)
Since Q1 < 0, ddt
(
λmaxS1 (t)
)
> 0 holds for sufficiently small λmaxS1 (t). Given S1(tf ) < 0, we know
λ(tf ) < 0 and, hence by (3.9) and the continuity of λmaxS1 (t), the maximal eigenvalue λ
max
S1
(t) < 0
for all t ∈ [t0, tf ]. This proves that S1(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ].
Additionally, Let
A¯ = A−
M∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj, (3.10)
following (3.5), Si(t) should satisfy
S˙i + SiA¯+ A¯
ᵀSi +Qi + SiBiR
−1
i B
ᵀ
i Si = 0; (3.11)
for i = 1, 2, 3, ...,M , and Si(tf ) = Sif . Let Φ(t, τ) be the state transition matrix of −A¯ᵀ(t). It is
known that for t, τ ∈ [t0, tf ],
dΦ(t, τ)
dt
= −A¯ᵀ(t)Φ(t, τ), Φ(τ, τ) = I; (3.12)
Then according to [27], Si(t) will satisfy
Si(t) = Φ(t, tf )Si(tf )Φ
ᵀ(t, tf ) +
∫ tf
t
Φ(t, τ)[Qi + SiBiR
−1
i B
ᵀ
i Si]Φ
ᵀ(t, τ)dτ. (3.13)
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Now, since Si(tf ) ≥ 0, Qi ≥ 0 and Ri > 0 for i = 2, 3...,M , it follows from (3.13) that Si(t) ≥ 0
for all t ∈ [t0, tf ] for i = 2, 3, ...,M .
Next, we present a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for uniform exponential stability and
assures that all states of the system are within a defined ball at the end of the game [28]. Later in
section 5, this result is used to guarantee capture of the evader.
Theorem 2. For the all-against-one game let Si(t) for i = 1, 2, ...,M be solution of (3.5) for
t ∈ [t0, tf ], and let
C(t) ,
M∑
j=1
(Qj + SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj) and P (t) ,
M∑
j=1
Sj(t).
If C(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ] and P (tf ) ≥ 0, then the system will be uniformly exponentially
stable and P (t) > 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ). Furthermore, for any positive scalar δ > 0, if
tf ≥ t0 + λ¯P
¯
λC
ln
(
λ¯P . ‖z0‖2
¯
λP .δ2
)
(3.14)
then it follows that ‖z(tf )‖ ≤ δ.
In the above theorem, λ¯(.) = max
t∈[t0,tf ]
λmax(.) , ¯
λ(.) = min
t∈[t0,tf ]
λmin(.) and ‖.‖ refers to the Euclidean norm.
Proof. The matrix P (t) satisfies the differential equation
P˙ + A¯ᵀP + PA¯+ C(t) = 0, P (tf ) = Ptf ; (3.15)
where Ptf =
∑M
j=1 Sjf and A¯(t) is as defined in (3.10). Consequently, following the definition of
8
Φ(t, tf ) in (3.12), P (t) also satisfies
P (t) = Φ(t, tf )P (tf )Φ
ᵀ(t, tf ) +
∫ tf
t
Φ(t, τ)C(τ)Φᵀ(t, τ)dτ.
Since P (tf ) ≥ 0 and C(t) > 0, it follows that P (t) > 0, for all t ∈ [t0, tf ). Now we can define the
Lyapunov function
V (t) = zᵀP (t)z, (3.16)
then
V˙ (t) = z˙ᵀP (t)z + zᵀP˙ (t)z + zᵀP (t)z˙ (3.17)
= zᵀ(A¯ᵀP + P˙ + PA¯)z (3.18)
= −zᵀC(t)z (3.19)
So C(t) > 0 results in the system to be uniformly exponentially stable. Additionally, since
V˙ ≤ −¯λC
λ¯P
zᵀPz ≤ −¯λC
λ¯P
V (3.20)
then one can conclude that
V (t) ≤ V (t0) exp[−¯λC
λ¯P
(t− t0)]. (3.21)
Moreover,
‖z(t)‖2 ≤ 1
¯
λP
V (t) (3.22)
≤ V (t0)
¯
λP
exp[−¯λC
λ¯P
(t− t0)] (3.23)
≤ λ¯P
¯
λP
‖z0‖2 exp[−¯λC
λ¯P
(t− t0)]. (3.24)
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Finally, in order to achieve ‖z(tf )‖ ≤ δ, tf should satisfy
λ¯P
¯
λP
‖z0‖2 exp[−¯λC
λ¯P
(tf − t0)] ≤ δ2 (3.25)
which yields (3.14) and this ends the proof.
Remark 1. The above theorem has been proved for M players with different quadratic cost func-
tions in a linear game while they are implementing their Nash strategies. Later in chapter 4,
different Nash solutions will be presented in which players either utilizes their Nash strategies ac-
cording to an M-player (all-against-one) game or 2-player (greedy or one-against-one) games or
cooperative (one-team-against-one) game. Thus, the above theorem can be applied directly to each
of those scenarios.
The following remark represents usefulness of the above theorem by providing a practical explicit
sufficient condition resulting in exponential stability of the system.
Remark 2. For all-against-one games, let the implemented strategies for player 1, 2, . . . ,M be as
(3.4). Noting that S1f and Q1 are negative semi-definite matrices, if S1f +
∑M
j=2 Sjf ≥ 0 and
Q1 +
∑M
j=2Qj ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [t0, tf ] then the system is exponentially stable regardless of initial
state vector z0. In other words, if the collective weights of players 2 through M overpower the
weights of player 1 (opposing player) in the objective functions then the exponential stability of
the whole system is assured.
Remark 3. Note that not only these results are applied to Pursuit-Evasion Games, but also they can
be utilized in any system of systems (or Multi-agent systems) in presence of a malicious subsystem
(or agent) [29]. The above theorem provides the exponential stability of the whole system only in
Linear Quadratic cases, however, the rest of paper presents a general idea which can be applied to
any kind of system as long as the aforementioned strategies can be calculated.
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Remark 4. As it is shown in the second part of theorem, note that if the hypothesis of theorem is
satisfied and if termination time tf is large enough, then the state of system is guaranteed to end
up in a small ball. In next section, this means that the capturing of the evader in a PE game is
guaranteed no matter how far the pursuers are at the beginning.
A sufficient condition for existence of solutions to (3.5) have been discussed in [27], where all
Q’s and S’s matrices are positive semi definite. The following theorem provides conditions for
existence of solutions to M-coupled differential Riccati equations which arise in the all-against-
one games.
Theorem 3. (Sufficient Condition for Existence of Nash Solution) Let Q ∈ RnN×nN be symmet-
ric andW (t) = −S1 +
∑M
i=2 Si while Si are the solutions of (3.5). Then Si, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}
exist for ∀t ≤ tf with
0 ≤ W (t) ≤ LQ(t) (3.26)
while
R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q) ≥ 0; (3.27)
With
R(S1, ..., SM , Q) = Q+W (
M∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj) + (
M∑
j=1
SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
j )W
+
(
S1B1R
−1
1 B
ᵀ
1S1 −
M∑
i=2
(SiBiR
−1
i B
ᵀ
i Si)
)
(3.28)
and LQ(t) is the unique solution of following linear terminal value problem (Lyapunov differential
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equation) while LQ(tf ) = −S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif
L˙Q(t) = −LQ(t)A− AᵀLQ(t)− (Q−Q1 +
M∑
i=2
Qi). (3.29)
Since R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q) is not explicitly a second order term in W , the Comparison Theorem
in [27] is not applicable to proof of this theorem. So we will prove the following theorem directly.
Proof. The first inequality of (3.26) is a consequence of Theorem 1. If A, Q and Qi are bounded
then LQ(t) exists for t ≤ tf since it follows a Lyapunov differential equation. Also, W (tf ) =
−S1f +
∑M
i=2 Sif and
W˙ =−WA− AᵀW − (Q−Q1 +
M∑
i=2
Qi)+
Q+W (
M∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
jSj) + (
M∑
j=1
SjBjR
−1
j B
ᵀ
j )W
+
(
S1B1R
−1
1 B
ᵀ
1S1 −
M∑
i=2
(SiBiR
−1
i B
ᵀ
i Si)
)
=−WA− AᵀW − (Q−Q1 +
M∑
i=2
Qi)
+R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q),
(3.30)
Now define Y = LQ −W , then Y (tf ) = 0 and
Y˙ =− (LQ −W )A− Aᵀ(LQ −W )
−R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q)
=− Y A− AᵀY −R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q)
(3.31)
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Since R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q) ≥ 0 then
Y˙ ≤ −Y A− AᵀY. (3.32)
Let’s define Z(t, τ) = Φᵀ1(t, τ)Y (t)Φ1(t, τ) while Φ1(t, τ) for all t, τ ≤ tf is defined as follows
Φ˙1(t, τ) = AΦ1(t, τ), Φ1(τ, τ) = I. (3.33)
Since Y (tf ) = 0 and det Φ1(t, τ) 6= 0 then Z(tf , τ) = 0 for all τ ≤ tf . Consequently,
∂Z(t, τ)
∂t
= Φᵀ1(t, τ)
[
AᵀY + Y˙ + Y A
]
Φ1(t, τ) ≤ 0 (3.34)
if Y is a solution of (3.31). Now if we define g(t, τ, v) = vᵀZ(t, τ)v for all t, τ ≤ tf and v ∈ RnN
then ∂
∂t
g(t, τ, v) ≤ 0 for all t ≤ tf . Therefore the mean value theorem yields
0 ≥ g(t1, τ, v)− g(t2, τ, v) = vᵀ[Z(t1, τ)− Z(t2, τ)]v (3.35)
for all t1 ≤ t2 ≤ tf and as a result Z(t1, τ) ≥ Z(t2, τ). So we conclude that Z(t, τ) ≥ Z(tf , τ)
for all t, τ ≤ tf . Finally choosing τ = t yields Y (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≤ tf . This ends the proof.
Remark 5. If we define
S¯1 = −S1, H1 = −Bᵀ1R−11 B1; (3.36)
S¯i = Si, Hi = B
ᵀ
iR
−1
i Bi, ∀i ∈ {2, 3, ...,M} (3.37)
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then the sufficient condition becomes
R(S1, ..., SM , Q) = Q+W (
M∑
j=1
Hj)W −
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
M∑
k=1
k 6=j
S¯iHjS¯k (3.38)
Proof. Notice that S¯i > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, on the other hand H1 < 0 and Hi > 0 ∀i ∈
{2, 3, ...,M} while W = ∑Mi=1 S¯i. So the equation follows since
W (
M∑
j=1
Hj)W =(
M∑
j=1
S¯jHj)W +
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
M∑
k=1
S¯iHjS¯k
=(
M∑
j=1
S¯jHj)W +W (
M∑
j=1
HjS¯j)
−
M∑
i=1
S¯iHiS¯i +
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
M∑
k=1
k 6=j
S¯iHjS¯k.
(3.39)
So we obtain
W (
M∑
j=1
Hj)W −
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
M∑
k=1
k 6=j
S¯iHjS¯k = (
M∑
j=1
SjB
ᵀ
jR
−1
j Bj)W +W (
M∑
j=1
BᵀjR
−1
j BjSj)
+ S1B
ᵀ
1R
−1
1 B1S1 −
M∑
i=2
SiB
ᵀ
iR
−1
i BiSi (3.40)
So we can rewrite the sufficient condition of the Theorem 3 as follow
R(S1, S2, ..., SM , Q) = R(−S¯1, S¯2, ..., S¯M , Q) = Q+W (
M∑
j=1
Hj)W −
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
j 6=i
M∑
k=1
k 6=j
S¯iHjS¯k
(3.41)
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Following the all-against-one game formulation in chapter 3, and for the sake of tractability of
the problem, we study a linear quadratic Pursuit-Evasion game as an all-against-one game. This
simplifies the explanation of the general concepts of the All-against-one games and its application
to a practical problem. In a multi-player pursuit-evasion game consisting of many pursuers and
one evader, each pursuer’s objective function reflects a desire to minimize the distance between
itself and the evader while the evader’s objective function reflects a need to escape by maximizing
a weighted measure of the distances between itself and the pursuers.
4.1 Pursuit-Evasion Game Formulation
Consider a PE game with N pursuers against one evader. The game is formulated as a finite time
LQ game in which the goal of the i-th pursuer is to minimize its distance with respect to the evader
while the evader’s goal is to maximize a weighted sum of the distances between itself and the
pursuers. In this section we are concerned with developing only strategies for the pursuers. In
doing so, the pursuers will assume that the evader will be using the corresponding Nash strategy
but will not know whether the evader will implement that strategy or not. The first strategy is
characterized by pursuers who cooperate as a team in their effort to catch the evader. The resulting
game is referred to as a Cooperating Pursuers Game. The second strategy is characterized by
non-cooperating pursuers who act in a non-cooperative manner among themselves and the evader.
The resulting game is referred to as a Non-Cooperating Pursuers Game. The third strategy is
characterized by greedy pursuers who act independently and selfishly each on its own in an attempt
to catch the evader. The resulting game is referred to as Greedy Pursuers Game.
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Let x1 ∈ Rn be the evader’s position vector and xi+1 ∈ Rn be i-th pursuer’s position vector and let
zi = x1 − xi+1, (4.1)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N , be the difference between position vector of the i-th pursuer and the evader as
illustrated in Figure 4.1. The system dynamics follows (3.1), where the state vector z is defined as
z =
[
zᵀ1 z
ᵀ
2 . . . z
ᵀ
N
]ᵀ
and ui ∈ Rn×1. Since the pursuers’ dynamics are uncoupled, the system
dynamics matrix A = blkdiag{A1, ..., AN} ∈ RnN×nN is block diagonal where Ai ∈ Rn×n for
i = 1, 2, ..., N . The input matrix of the evader is Be = B1 = 1N ⊗ In ∈ RnN×n and the input
matrices of the pursuers are Bpi = Bi+1 = −ei ⊗ In ∈ RnN×n for i = 1, 2, ..., N . In ∈ Rn×n is
the identity matrix, ei ∈ RN denotes the vector with a 1 in the i-th coordinate and 0’s elsewhere,
1N ∈ RN×1 is a vector with all the entries equal to 1 and⊗ is the Kronecker product. Dimension n
can be any positive integer, for example 2 or 3 which represents a PE game with 2 or 3 dimensions,
respectively. Each player should minimize the objective function as defined in (3.2) and (3.3),
where Sif ∈ RnN×nN , Qi ∈ RnN×nN and Ri ∈ Rn×n are the dimensions of weight matrices of the
i-th player. For the player 1, the evader, Qe = Q1 < 0, Sef = S1f < 0 and Re = R1 > 0. For
players 2 thorough M , the pursuers, Qpi = Q(i+1) ≥ 0, Spif = S(i+1)f ≥ 0 and Rpi = R(i+1) > 0
for i = 1, 2, ..., N .
In this thesis, we consider three different strategies for the pursuers which have different Nash
attributes. These strategies are discussed in the following subsections. The weights in the players’
objective functions (3.2) and (3.3) are chosen as follow
Spfi =fpiei ⊗ In, Sef =− diag{fe1 , ..., feN} ⊗ In,
Qpi =qpiei ⊗ In, Qe =− diag{qe1 , ..., qeN} ⊗ In,
Rpi =rpi ⊗ In, Re =re ⊗ In,
(4.2)
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where fei , qei , re and fpi , qpi , rpi for i = 1, 2, ..., N are positive scalar weights for the evader and
corresponding i-th pursuer, respectively. Furthermore, for simplicity, we will assume that t0 = 0.
We should also mention that in developing the pursuers strategies we will assume that all players
have full measurements of the state vectors they need to implement their closed-loop strategies. In
practice, however, full state measurements may not be available. Problems with partial state mea-
surement and problems with information network topology among the players will be considered
in a follow-up paper.
x
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x N
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1
Figure 4.1: Pursuers and the Evader on an x-y Coordinate System
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Figure 4.2: PE Game Between Cooperative Pursuers (as a Team) and the Evader.
4.1.1 Cooperative Pursuers Strategy
This game describes a situation where the pursuers act as one team against the evader as illustrated
in Figure 4.2. Essentially, it is a 2-player game where all the pursuers’ controls are combined as one
control vector. The cooperation among the pursuers can be formulated as a convex combination
of their cost functions as JP =
∑N
i=1 αiJpi , where αi > 0,
∑N
i=1 αi = 1 and Jpi = Ji+1 for
i = 1, 2, ..., N as they are defined in (3.2) and (3.3). The weight αi can be interpreted as the
fraction of the total effort that the i-th pursuer is contributing towards the team. Consequently, the
cost function for the pursuers as a team becomes
JP =
1
2
z(tf )
ᵀSPf z(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[z(t)ᵀQP z(t) + ui(t)
ᵀRPui(t)]dt (4.3)
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where
SPf =
N∑
i=1
αiSpfi , QP =
N∑
i=1
αiQpi , RP =
N∑
i=1
αiRpi (4.4)
The evader’s cost function as defined in (3.2) becomes Je = J1. The system dynamics of (3.1)
becomes
z˙ = Az +Beue +BPuP , (4.5)
where ue = u1 ∈ Rn×1 is the evader’s control vector and uP = [uᵀ2, uᵀ3, ..., uᵀM ]ᵀ ∈ RNn×1 is the
combined control vector of the pursuers as a team. The matrix Be = 1N ⊗ In is the input matrix
of the evader and BP = −IN ⊗ In is the combined input matrix of pursuers as a team.
The system dynamics (4.5), and objective functions (4.3) and Je form 2-player LQ game. A Pareto
Front solution of cooperation among the pursuers can be obtained by using different values of αi
which impacts the performance of the pursuers as will be illustrated in Section 5.3. The closed-loop
Nash strategies for the pursuers can be obtained from (3.4) as follow
u∗P = −R−1P BPSP z, (4.6)
u∗e = −R−1e BeSez; (4.7)
where the matrices SP and Se are the solutions to the following coupled differential Riccati equa-
tions
S˙P + SPA+ A
ᵀSP +QP − SPBPR−1P BᵀPSP − SPBeR−1e BᵀeSe − SeBeR−1e BᵀeSP = 0, (4.8)
S˙e + SeA+ A
ᵀSe +Qe − SeBeR−1e BᵀeSe − SeBPR−1P BᵀPSP − SPBPR−1P BᵀPSe = 0, (4.9)
where SP (tf ) = SPf and Se(tf ) = Sef . We note that the evader’s strategy in (4.6) is only calculated
in order to determine the pursuers’ strategy, but there is no guarantee that the evader will actually
use that strategy.
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4.1.2 Non-Cooperative Pursuers Strategies
This game represent a situation where the pursuers are competing among themselves in their effort
to capture the evader as illustrated in Figure 4.3.The Nash equilibrium in this case will involve
all pursuers and evader simultaneously, and the corresponding non-cooperative pursuers strategies
can be determined using (3.4) and (3.5).
E
P1
P2
PN−1
PN
.....
Game
Figure 4.3: PE Game among Non-Cooperative Pursuers and the Evader.
4.1.3 Greedy Pursuers Strategies
This game represent a situation where the pursuers are greedy. That is, each pursuer decides to
ignore all other pursuers and pursue the evader on its own as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Essentially,
in this case we have N separate PE games between each pursuer and the evader. The pursuers’
strategies are similar to the ones proposed in [1] where each pursuer moves exactly toward the
evader at each instant of time, ignoring what the others are doing.
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Figure 4.4: Separate PE Games Between Each Greedy Pursuer and the Evader.
According to the problem formulation (4.2) and (4.1), dynamics of the games can be represented
by N decoupled systems
z˙i = Aizi +Beiuei +Bpiupi , (4.10)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N , where Bei = Be ◦ (ei ⊗ In) is the corresponding part of the original input
matrix Be as defined in (3.3) with respect to i-th player, with input matrix Bpi ∈ Rn×n, and ◦
is the Hadamard product. If each pursuer ignores the effect of the other pursuers, its game with
the evader assumes that the evader is playing only versus that pursuer and ignoring the others. In
another word, the evader’s cost function against i-th pursuer is as follows
Jei =
1
2
z(tf )
ᵀSeifz(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[z(t)ᵀQeiz(t) + uei(t)
ᵀReuei(t)]dt, (4.11)
where Seif = Sef ◦ blkdiag{ei ⊗ In} and Qei = Qe ◦ blkdiag{ei ⊗ In} are the evader weights
instead of Sef , Qe in (4.2), respectively. According to (3.4) and (3.5), the closed-loop Nash greedy
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strategies can be obtained for each pursuer as follows
u∗pig = −R−1pi BpiSpfiz, (4.12)
u∗eig = −R−1e BeiSeiz; (4.13)
where Spfi and Sei are the solutions to the following coupled differential Riccati equations
S˙pi + SpiA¯i + A¯
ᵀ
iSpi +Qpi − SpiBpiR−1pi BᵀpiSpi − SpiBeiR−1e BᵀeiSei − SeiBeiR−1e BᵀeiSpi = 0
(4.14)
S˙ei + SeiA¯i + A¯
ᵀ
iSei +Qei − SeiBeiR−1e BᵀeiSei − SeiBpiR−1pi BᵀpiSpi − SpiBpiR−1pi BᵀpiSei = 0
(4.15)
for i = 1, 2, ..., N , where Spi(tf ) = Spif , Sei(tf ) = Seif and matrix A¯i = blkdiag{ei ⊗ Ai}. Note
that equation (4.12) is in form of full state closed-loop. However, Spfi contains zeros in all entries
except the ones related to i-th pursuer, indicating that the i-th pursuer needs only measurement of
the distance between itself and the evader to implement its control.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
In this chapter, we demonstrate applications of the strategies (developed in chapter 4) in various
situations by illustrating examples of games with and without uncertainties in parameters and in-
formation about players. Not only the strategies are significantly different, but also the number of
pursuers chasing the evader as well as their initial position and characteristic are crucial factors
that lead to various outcome in different situations. Additionally, it’s significantly useful if one
could predict the outcome of a game given the information about players and their characteristics
in an All-against-one game. In order to make it feasible, we have developed a user-friendly soft-
ware package that provides the opportunity of simulating any planar multi-player Pursuit-Evasion
game by only inputting the information about the players. So if this data were available precisely,
then one could forecast the outcome of a game thoroughly by using that software. However, in
most of the real problems, this information may not be known by other players and only uncertain
estimations of parameters might be feasible. We discuss these kind of problems in section 5.3 and
we study similar problems to the examples in section 5.2 under different scenarios where there are
uncertainties about the strategies and also parameters in the cost function of each player.
5.1 PE Game Software
In this section, we explain the software that we have developed to solve planar PE games with
any number of pursuers chasing an evader. The software gives the opportunity to choose different
strategies for each side of the game as shown in Figure 5.1 . For example, the pursuers can choose
to play non-cooperatively as independent players or they can decide o play cooperatively as a team.
Also, possibility of different team formation has been augmented in the software, i.e. the portion
of contribution of each pursuer towards the team can be chosen in each team formation as shown
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in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b. In the next section, a number of different examples shows the output of
software for simulation of some three-pursuers one-evader games.
Figure 5.1: Software - Compatible with Mac OS X and Windows
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(a) Main Page
(b) Output
Figure 5.2: Software - An example of Cooperative pursuers versus the evader escaping from the
closest pursuer
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5.2 Illustrative Examples
Consider a three-pursuer one-evader game on the plane (so n = 2) with parameters as described
in Table 5.1. The entries under the position column are the x-y coordinates of each player, under
the f column represent the weights in Sif , under the r column represent the weights in Ri. The
parameters in the evader row are the same against each of three pursuers. For simplicity, the control
input of each player is assumed to be velocity which leads to a system dynamics matrix of A = 0.
The terminal time is assumed to be tf = 3 and the evader is assumed to be captured if it enters a
capture circle of radius δ = 0.1 from any one pursuer. The three pursuers’ strategies are determined
as described in the previous section and the evader in each case is implementing the corresponding
Nash strategy in each case.
Table 5.1: Positions and Parameters of Player in the Example
Position Parameters1
f q r
Evader [3, 3] -10 -10 1
Pursuer 1 [4, 0] 3 3 0.4
Pursuer 2 [0, 3] 3 3 0.8
Pursuer 3 [2, 1] 4 4 2.8
1. Parameters are the diagonal entries in (4.2).
The resulting trajectories of pursuers are illustrated in Figure 5.3a, 5.4a and 5.5a, and the corre-
sponding distances of pursuers to the evader are illustrated in Figure 5.3b, 5.4b and 5.5b. In the
cooperative pursuers game, αi = 0.3¯ are used in the team objective functions, representing equal
contributions by all pursuers.Note that the evader is able to escape when each pursuer uses the
greedy strategy but it gets captured when the pursuers implement either the cooperative or the non-
cooperative strategies. However, the method by which the evader gets captured in these two games
are noticeably different. When the pursuers cooperate as a team they seem to encircle and entrap
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the evader before capturing (Figure 5.3a) while when they do not cooperate they seem to target
the evader directly (Figure 5.4a). In both of these games the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied
yielding trajectories that are exponentially stable (Figures 5.4b and 5.3b).
In the greedy pursuers strategy, the fact that each pursuers are moving exactly towards the evader
causes the evader to escape (Figure 5.5a). In this case the condition of Theorem 2 are not satisfied.
We should note that in this example we have assumed that all players have full information about
the parameters of other side, which also may not be feasible in realistic situations.
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Figure 5.3: Example - PE Game with Cooperative Pursuers.
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Figure 5.4: Example - PE Game with Non-Cooperative Pursuers.
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Figure 5.5: Example - PE Game with Greedy Pursuers.
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5.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
In the illustrative example in the previous section, we have assumed that each player has full
knowledge of the parameters in the objective functions of all other players (i.e. Table 5.1). In
a practical PE game, however, this may not the case. We have also assumed that in each of the
three pursuers strategies considered, the evader is implementing the strategy that yields a Nash
equilibrium in each case. In a practical PE game, this also may not be the case.
With such lack of knowledge of the game parameters and strategy used by the evader, the pursuers
might be interested in determining the probabilities of capturing the evader under some statistical
distribution of these parameters and for several possible strategies used by the evader.
To accomplish this, we performed Monte Carlo simulations on a 3-pursuers one-evader game ac-
cording to three different scenarios with parameter distributions and initial positions as shown in
Table 5.2. The only difference between these scenarios is the initial position of players. Basically,
this indicates the impact of initial positions of players on the output of the game.
Table 5.2: Positions and Parameters of Pursuers in MC Simulation
Positions Parameters
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 f q r
Evader [6, 6] [6, 6] [6, 6] ?U [−3,−1] U [−3,−1] U [1, 3]
Pursuer 1 [7, 3] [4, 0] [4, 0] U [0, 2] U [0, 2] U [1, 10]
Pursuer 2 [3, 6] [3, 6] [0, 3] U [0, 2] U [0, 2] U [1, 10]
Pursuer 3 [5, 4] [5, 4] [5, 4] U [0, 2] U [0, 2] U [1, 10]
? U [a, b] indicates the Uniform distribution between a and b.
In the cooperative pursuers strategies we used four different team configurations with different
choices of αi parameters as shown in Table 5.3. In Team 1, 2 and 3 we have given one pursuer a
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higher share of the total effort (0.8) than the other two and in Team 4 we have assigned equal share
of the total effort (0.3) to the three pursuers.
Table 5.3: Value of αi for Each Pursuer in Different Team Formations
Pursuer 1
α1
Pursuer 2
α2
Pursuer 3
α3
Team 1 0.8 0.1 0.1
Team 2 0.1 0.8 0.1
Team 3 0.1 0.1 0.8
Team 4 0.3¯ 0.3¯ 0.3¯
Each sample of the MC simulation represents all different combinations of strategies for the pur-
suers and evader. The outcome of each simulation is defined to be a Bernoulli random variable
of 1 if the pursuers capture the evader with probability of (ρ) and of 0 if the evader escapes with
probability of (1− ρ). Assuming that the error distribution is normal as in [30, 31], the confidence
interval of the simulated mean value would be
[e−, e+] = [ρ− zγ/2.s, ρ+ zγ/2.s] (5.1)
where s =
√
ρ(1−ρ)
n
is the standard deviation of n samples and zγ/2 is the critical value of the
Normal distribution for a given error level γ. The desired margin of error ε is half of the confidence
interval, so the number of required samples can be calculated as follows:
ε = zγ/2.s (5.2)
n =
[zγ/2√ρ(1− ρ)
ε
]2
(5.3)
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Also in terms of desired percentage of margin of error, it can be calculated as:
E = 100× zγ/2.s
ρ
(5.4)
n = (
1
ρ
− 1)
[100zγ/2
E
]2
(5.5)
For a 95% confidence level, the error level is γ = 0.05 and the critical value would be zγ/2 =
1.96. For a desired margin of error ε = 0.01, the resulting minimum number of required samples
becomes 9, 604 which happens when ρ = 0.5. Consequently, in the worst case, with a confidence
level of 95% we can assert that the percentages of capturing probability will be accurate with a
maximum error of ±1%. In our Monte Carlo simulation we used 10, 000 runs, each consisting of
all possible combinations of strategies by pursuers and evader. This required 15 hours of CPU time
on a super computer with 10 Intel Xeon 64-bit CPUs. The results of the simulation are shown in
Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.
For each possible strategy of the evader, the pursuers strategy that yields the highest probability of
capturing the evader is indicated by ‡ on Table 5.4. The highest such probability occurs when the
pursuers are using a non-cooperative strategy and the evader uses a Nash Strategy against Team 3.
The lowest capturing probability occurs when the pursuers use also the non-cooperative strategy
and the evader uses a Nash strategy against the closest pursuer. In between these two extremes, the
pursuers could run the risk of attaining very low probabilities of capturing the evader. For example,
if the pursuers cooperate according to Team 3 to achieve a capturing probability of 67%, they run
the risk of attaining 2% probability of capture (or 98% of probability of escape) if the evader uses
a Nash strategy against the closest pursuer. Thus, the safest strategy for the pursuers is to use the
non-cooperative strategy.
On the other side, the evader may perform a similar Monte Carlo simulation to arrive at Table
5.4. From the evader’s perspective, for every strategy that the pursuers use, the strategy that yields
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the lowest probability of capture is indicated with a †. Consequently the safest strategy for the
evader is to use the Nash strategy against the closest pursuer. If both sides use the safest strategy,
this eventually would result in a 46% probability of capture (or 54% probability of escape) of the
evader.
Table 5.4: Scenario 1: Monte Carlo Simulation (Capturing Probability in Percent)
Evader’s Nash Strategies versus:
Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers
Closest
Pursuer
Pu
rs
ue
rs
N
as
h
St
ra
te
gi
es
vs
E
va
de
r
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e
Pu
rs
ue
rs Team 1 64 20
† 29 61? 20† 24
Team 2 60 32 14† 56 17 20
Team 3 66? 9 7 7 32 2†
Team 4 23 28 36 15† 25 17
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers 59 69
? 74? 53 48? 46?†
Greedy
Pursuers 18 10 11 11 7
† 31
? Optimal reaction set of pursuers
† Optimal reaction set of evader
In scenarios 2 and 3, initial position of Pursuer 1 and 2 have been moved further out of the evader,
respectively. As it is shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, the probabilities of captures are much lower in
comparison to scenario 1. Also in Scenario 2, if both side of the game choose to play with security
strategy the outcome of the game would be 40% probability of capture of evader. Similarly in
Scenario 3, the secure strategy for the pursuers is Non-cooperative and for the evader is versus the
Closet Pursuer, and if both chooses their security strategy the outcome of the game would be 20%
probability of capture of the evader or 80% probability of escape.
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Table 5.5: Scenario 2: Monte Carlo Simulation (Capturing Probability in Percent)
Evader’s Nash Strategies versus:
Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers
Closest
Pursuer
Pu
rs
ue
rs
N
as
h
St
ra
te
gi
es
vs
E
va
de
r
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e
Pu
rs
ue
rs Team 1 68
? 23 10† 60 27 14
Team 2 39 10 5 32 11 3†
Team 3 53 13 8† 36 21 35
Team 4 28 5† 19 20 26 16
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers 61 46
? 41? 63? 59? 40?†
Greedy
Pursuers 9 4 7 8 3
† 28
? Optimal reaction set of pursuers
† Optimal reaction set of evader
Table 5.6: Scenario 3: Monte Carlo Simulation (Capturing Probability in Percent)
Evader’s Nash Strategies versus:
Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers
Closest
Pursuer
Pu
rs
ue
rs
N
as
h
St
ra
te
gi
es
vs
E
va
de
r
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e
Pu
rs
ue
rs Team 1 51 23 6
† 44 19 14
Team 2 39 10 1† 30 10 2
Team 3 35 11 6† 42 12 23?
Team 4 19 2† 16 12 20 8
Non-Cooperative
Pursuers 54
? 25? 36? 47? 56? 20†
Greedy
Pursuers 6 3 3 6 1
† 23?
? Optimal reaction set of pursuers
† Optimal reaction set of evader
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this thesis we considered an all-against-one LQ game and provided necessary conditions for the
closed-loop Nash strategies as well as sufficient conditions for exponential stability of the result-
ing state trajectory. This all-against-one game was used as a framework to study three different
pursuers strategies in a multi-pursuers one evader PE game. The strategies considered include
cooperating, non-cooperating and greedy pursuers. In each case, these strategies are derived as-
suming that the evader is also using in each case the corresponding Nash strategy. An example is
used to illustrate these strategies and show several different approaches that may be used by the
pursuers to capture the evader. Finally, in the absence of complete information on the parameters
in the objective functions, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 runs to produce
probabilities of capture of the evader under uniform distribution of the parameter spaces and for
several different strategies that could be used by the evader against the three proposed strategies
for the pursuers.
The results indicate that in all-against-one games under parameter uncertainties, the Cooperative
Nash strategy for the pursuers is not always the best choice. Furthermore, the Non-cooperative
Nash strategy turns out to be the safest one in most of the cases. This is due to the existence of an
adversary agent in the system and parameter uncertainties between players, so that it’s not always
safe for the pursuers to rely on the cooperation among themselves. Also, the Greedy Nash strategy
is the worst one in almost all the cases unless the evader also chooses its Nash strategy versus only
one of the pursuers (e.g. the closest one).
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